Analysing why certain information spreads-or not-can be highly relevant for understanding an intervention's potential impact. Two recently implemented policy changes related to EMTCT (elimination of mother-to-child transmission of HIV) in the Balaka district of Malawi give ample opportunity to assess how new information trickles through a targeted rural community. One of the policies entails the lifetime provision of ART (anti-retroviral therapy) to all HIVþ pregnant womena governmental strategy to EMTCT first initiated in Malawi and now being expanded throughout the region. The second new policy concerns a pilot project in which women are financially rewarded for attending antenatal care and delivering in the hospital. An in-depth anthropological approach was used to assess what women in one village community know about the policy changes and how they had come to know about it. Although the policies were implemented more or less at the same time, awareness and knowledge levels among village women differed largely: In case of the first, awareness stagnated at the level of those who directly received the information from health professionals. In the case of the second, highly accurate and up-to-date knowledge had spread throughout the village community. I suggest three reasons for this divergence: (i) perceived talk-worthiness of (issues addressed by) the interventions, (ii) motives for hiding or disclosing involvement in either of the interventions and (iii) the visibility of each intervention, or in other words, the (im)possibility to hide involvement. I argue that these reasons for women's structural silence on one policy change and prompt sharing of information on another follow a distinctly gendered logic. The findings underline that the diffusion of new information is to a great extent shaped by the social particularities of the context in which it is introduced.
Introduction
The recent introduction of two policy interventions related to EMTCT (elimination of mother-to-child transmission of HIV) in the Balaka district of Malawi provides ample opportunity to assess how new information spreads through a targeted community. What strikes most in this case study is the divergence in villagers' awareness and knowledge of the two policy changes: awareness of one did not reach beyond the women who had received the information from health care professionals, while detailed knowledge about the other had trickled through to all village women.
For some time, social scientists and policymakers assumed that the impact of new information depended primarily on the content of the message itself. The process through which new information diffuses was taken to be straightforward and therefore not problematized (see Peterson 2003, pp. 87-8; Spitulnik 1993 , pp. 294-6 for reviews). Over the past decennia, however, communication research has shown that messages should not simply be seen as static entities that can be linearly transmitted from sender to receiver. Studies by anthropologists revealed, eg, that the same mass media message was perceived and interpreted differently in different cultural settings, which logically led to diverse impacts on the respective audiences (e.g. Ang 1990 ; Liebes and Katz 1990; Verheijen 2006) .
Analysing whether and how information about new policies spreads can be highly relevant to understanding their potential reach and impact. Moreover, as it appears from this article, analysing differences in spreading patterns can provide insights into the underlying socio-economic and cultural grid of a community.
One of the major theorists on the diffusion of new information has been Everett Rogers. Over a timespan of decades and based on a vast set of empirical case studies across fields and disciplines, Rogers developed an elaborate, highly influential framework of factors that impact on the adoption, adaption or rejection of an innovation (e.g. see Haider and Kreps 2004) . According to this framework the first stage of diffusion is an individual's detection of the existence of an innovation, which, in a technically underequipped setting like rural Malawi depends by and large on interpersonal contact. The second stage entails forming an attitude towards the innovation, about which Rogers writes:
Most individuals evaluate an innovation [defined as 'an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new'], not on the basis of scientific research by experts, but through the subjective evaluations of peers . . . So the diffusion process is essentially social in nature, driven by individuals talking to others and giving meaning to an innovation through a process of social construction. (Rogers 1995, p. 36) What this points to is the critical importance of studying who talks about what with whom, how, and why-which is precisely what I will do in this article. I first describe the setting in which the policies were implemented and elaborate upon the details of each policy. I then describe what different villagers knew about each policy change, and how they had come to know this. Following, I propose a combination of three factors to explain the strikingly different spreading patterns of knowledge about the policy changes. Last, I argue that these factors are shaped by and reflect the particularities of women's positionality within the research setting.
Methods
This article builds on ethnographic data that were collected in one village community in the Balaka district of Malawi's Southern Region, as well as its nearest maternal health clinic at about 1-h walking distance. To protect the privacy of this study's informants, the village has been given the fictitious name of Mudzi. Like the inhabitants of Mudzi, over 80% of the Malawian population (15 of 18 million) lives in rural areas (GoM 2017, p. 31) .
Of all 188 countries on the Human Development Index, only 18 are calculated to be less 'developed' than Malawi (HDI 2015) . Over one-third of Malawian children is chronically undernourished (GoM 2017, p. 159), over two-thirds of the population lives below the international poverty line of having <1.90 USD to spend per day (World Bank 2010) and faces food shortages each year during the so-called 'hunger season'.
Ever since HIV prevalence became monitored, Malawi has been among the top-ten of countries with highest infection rates. It is currently estimated that nine per cent of the population between the ages 15 and 49 lives with the virus (GoM 2017, p. 29)-a rate that has remained static over the past decade. The estimated percentages of men (9%) and women (16%) living with HIV are twice as high in Malawi's Southern Region as in the rest of the country (GoM 2017, p. 238). As elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, HIV transmission occurs mainly through unprotected heterosexual sex. In Malawi, mother-to-child transmission (during pregnancy, delivery, or breastfeeding) accounts for 10% of new infections (GoM 2014, p. 7) .
Related to the extremely high levels of economic underdevelopment, poverty, malnourishment and HIV prevalence are the high rates of maternal and neonatal mortality. Maternal mortality increased significantly during the 1980s and 1990s, as HIV and AIDS rampaged the region, peaking in 1999 at 971 maternal deaths per 100.000 births (Colbourn et al. 2013 ). With a current estimated ratio of 510 maternal deaths per 100.000 births, Malawi still ranks among the 15 nations with highest maternal mortality rates worldwide (WHO et al. 2014) . However, impressive progress has been made in reducing the number of maternal deaths, which has been attributed to improved health care provision and efforts to control HIV (Colbourn et al. 2013) . Per every 1000 life births, an approximate 27 new-borns die within the first month after birth-a ration that has only minimally declined over the past decades (Zimba et al. 2012, p. 89) .
Because most of these indicators peak in the rural areas of Malawi and in its Southern Region in particular (GoM 2017), a research site was selected here. Mudzi is located at about 2-h walking from the district's capital. The village exists of an 70 households, two water pumps, a tiny mosque and a graveyard amidst the surrounding agricultural fields. Most of the households exist of a woman and her children, and, if she is a bit older, grandchildren too. Only nine women of total 98 women have had a steady marriage over (at least) the past decade, most other women are married
Key Messages
• Analysing why certain information spreads or not can be highly relevant for understanding an intervention's potential impact, and can provide crucial insights into the socio-economic and cultural grid of a community.
• The two policy changes discussed in this article were introduced more or less at the same time and through almost similar channels, yet one is widely known about by the studied women, while the other not.
• I suggest three reasons for women's structural silence on one policy change and prompt sharing of information on the other: (i) perceived talk-worthiness of (issues addressed by) the interventions, (ii) motives for hiding or disclosing involvement in either of the interventions, and (iii) the visibility of each intervention, or in other words, the (im)possibility to hide involvement with it.
• The logics behind these reasons reflect the gendered positionality of women in this particular cultural and socio-economic setting.
on and off. Men in Mudzi tend to be either temporal members (for the duration of a short marriage) or absent members (as they migrated in search for work). About two-third of the women is Muslim, the others are Christians of various denominations. Roughly all Muslim women in Mudzi are ethnically of Yao descent, while the rest descends from various other ethnic groups (Chewa, Lomwe, Sena, Ngoni). All Mudzi households grow maize for food; only very few yield enough to eat from one harvest to the next. Villagers rarely if ever read a newspaper; some own a radio but often lack money to buy batteries. News, in short, spreads by word of mouth mostly. The research for this article was conducted from September 2014 to January 2015, but prior in-depth knowledge of the community had been gained during a yearlong field study from 2008 to 2009. The fieldwork was conducted by myself-a Dutch woman with a PhD degree in medical anthropology-and my long-time research assistant Gertrude-a Malawian woman with a bachelor degree in rural development. For 4 of the 19 weeks, we lived together in the research community, participated in daily life activities, and interviewed all 98 adult women of the village, some several times, as much as possible in a naturalistic, conversational manner-like we had done during our yearlong study. The other weeks, Gertrude stayed in the village on her own, and wrote elaborate daily reports which we then discussed over the phone. To assess what women talked about when not probed by me about specific topics, we-and Gertrude in particular-participated in and overheard many informal conversations between women (and to lesser extent between women and men, and men with men), e.g. at the village's water pump; during the many informal gatherings in the shade of our house; during more private meetings at women's own houses; when accompanying each other on the way to the market, the clinic or funerals in other villages etc. All village women had been individually visited by us to explain that we were interested to understand more about their daily lives, to emphasize that they were free to not answer our questions or participate otherwise, and to ask permission for sharing the insights that they provided us with. We furthermore interviewed the head nurse of the nearest maternal health clinic and the government's Health Surveillance Assistant (HSA) who attends to Mudzi and surrounding villages at several occasions, observed health service provision both at the clinic at several occasions, participated in all maternal-and-child health activities within the village, and examined the village birth register book.
Results

Two new EMTCT policies
Option B1: HIV treatment as prevention Medication to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV has since 2004 become increasingly available throughout Malawi. As few Malawians tested for HIV voluntarily, testing was made a standard component 1 of antenatal care (ANC) services, which are well attended throughout Malawi (GoM 2005, pp. 133-5; GoM 2017, p. 119) . Until 2008 the policy to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV entailed the provision of a single dose of Nevirapine to the mother at the onset of labour and to the new-born after birth. In 2009, pregnant infected women not eligible for lifelong ART (which depended on how badly the immune system was already affected, measured by the number of CD4 cells in a patients' blood or a patient's appearance if CD4 counting equipment was lacking), were offered temporal ART for the duration of the motherto-child transmission risk period. In 2011, Malawi pioneered in the provision of lifelong ART to all pregnant women living with HIV regardless of CD4 count or clinical stage. 2 Arguments for the new policy included the limited availability of equipment to count CD4 cells in the country, the complexity of the earlier treatment protocols, the stigma resulting from curtailed breastfeeding, the viral rebound and thus increased transmission risk after stopping ART, and the risk of drug resistance after temporary ART. Anticipated advantages included the overall improvement of women's health and reduction of HIV transmission between discordant couples (Schouten et al. 2011; WHO 2013, p. xi) . The new approach, called Option Bþ, fits in well with a general shift in the international discourse on HIV and AIDS from controlling the pandemic to eradicating the virus. The clinic nearest to Mudzi began to implement Option B þ mid 2013. Already prior to that, it distributed ART to patients eligible based on low CD4 counts.
RBF4MNH: financial reward for hospital delivery RBF4MNH stands for Results-based Financing for Maternal and Newborn Health. The program is run by the Malawi Ministry of Health (with funds from the governments of Germany and Norway) and aims to reduce maternal and newborn mortality by improving the quality of health care provision and stimulate the uptake of these services. At the time of this study, the intervention was still in its pilot phase, running from 2012 to 2015. During this pilot phase only a limited number of emergency obstetric and neonatal care (EmONC) facilities in a limited number of districts 3 were targeted, including the one nearest to Mudzi. Direct investments were made to upgrade and sufficiently equip the selected facilities, and financial rewards are provided to facility staff if the quantity and quality of the services that they provide meet certain standards. A financial reward is also offered to clients if they comply with certain conditions. Women receive a fixed sum for delivering at the health facility and for each of the two days after delivery that they remain in the facility. This fixed amount is topped up by a variable amount that depends on the distance from the woman's place of residence to the facility. The cash transfer is framed as a compensation for travel expenses, expenditure on required childbirth items such as a basin and wrapping cloth, and loss of productivity while being away from home (Brenner et al. 2014) . In Mudzi, women started receiving this conditional cash transfer in January 2014. The maximum amount that they could receive was initially 3.600 MK 4 (1.800 MK for delivery, 750 MK for each of the two days that a woman remains at the facility, and 300 MK travel expenses). In January 2015, the amounts were adapted to inflation and increased to 5.600 MK 5 (2.000 MK for the delivery, 1.400 MK for each of the two days that a woman remains at the facility, and 800 MK travel fee). As a comparison: a day labourer employed at the nearest farm estate earns 550 MK per day.
Although not included in the official program guidelines, Mudzi women are told by clinical staff that they must come for ANC services at least three times during their pregnancy, starting in the third or fourth month of the pregnancy, in order to receive the cash reward. Those who attend ANC only twice, of which at least once during the first six months of the pregnancy, still receive the money, the clinic's head nurse told us. Mudzi women who delivered at the designated clinic but had not come for ANC before they were six months pregnant, did not receive the money.
Notably, the financial reward if accompanied by a penalty of 3.000 MK 6 for non-hospital deliveries-half of which is to be paid to one's own village chief, in either cash or kind, the other half to the chief of the village where the maternal health clinic is located. Although a lot of interesting material can be shared on this fine too, it does not significantly add to or alter the main argument that I try to make in this article. For sake of brevity and clarity, I have chosen not to discuss this fine in further detail. Already prior to the introduction of these financial incentives, hospital-deliveries were common practice in Mudzi. Village records and women's accounts indicate that home-births had declined over the 10 years before our research, with almost none occurring within the past 5 years.
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What do villagers know about these policies and how?
Option B 1 Assessing the levels of awareness and knowledge of Option B þ was the underlying rationale of the study on which this article is based. To this end, my research assistant and I started by trying out what responses the term 'Option Bþ' triggered. It did not seem to ring a bell with anyone but the nurse at the nearest maternal health clinic. Even the government-trained health extension worker (called 'Health Surveillance Assistant' or HSA) was not familiar with the term, although he did recognize the policy once I explained what it entails. Following, Gertrude and I asked almost all village women and several village men: who according to them were entitled to receive free ART these days. Most men and women, regardless of age, told us that people whose CD4 count is found to be too low are advised to take ARVs for the rest of their lives. One man explained: 'When the body is found to be still strong, no medication [ART] is needed yet.' When I asked whether this goes for both men and women most confirmed. When I explicitly asked about women who are pregnant, most female respondents explained that these receive a pill to prevent transmission of the virus to the child and that the child after birth receives medication too. Some even specified that this medication is called Nevirapine. A few women described longer term but still temporary treatment.
Only women who had given birth since the introduction of Option B þ told us that pregnant HIVþ women can receive lifelong ART regardless of their CD4 count. They heard about this during the counselling session prior to the HIV test that has become a standard element of ANC services in Malawi. Only two women who did not recently give birth knew about the new policy. In both cases, they had accompanied their unmarried, young adult daughters to their first ANC session at the hospital and heard about it there. Notably, none of the women who knew about Option B þ thought that this policy was new, stating that the current treatment protocol has been in place for long. Strikingly, what women (who gave birth within the past decennium) assumed to be the current policy on ARV provision mirrored the policy that was in place when they last attended ANC. This suggests that women tend to hear about HIV treatment policies mainly if not only during ANC check-ups. Indeed, the clinic's head nurse confirmed that Option B þ is standardly communicated about only during a pregnant woman's first ANC visit, and not during, e.g. family planning consults. More importantly, it suggests that women do not talk about ART policies amongst each other. Information about this does not circulate through the village community; awareness stagnates at the level of those directly targeted with the information. This lack of discussion and diffusion differs markedly from the other new policies aimed at (or at least 'framed' as aimed at) improving maternal and newborn health more broadly: the financial incentives for ANC check-ups and hospital delivery.
Financial incentives for hospital delivery
As mentioned, we came to Mudzi to assess the levels of awareness and knowledge of Option Bþ. However, in talking about issues of pregnancy, ANC and hospitals we frequently heard about the other policies: the financial incentives to deliver at the hospital. Both old and young women brought it up by themselves.
Although information about Option B þ is only disseminated at the hospital, and exclusively during ANC sessions, information about the RBF4MNH program is also brought to the villages by the earlier mentioned HSAs. Since 1995 the Malawi government has been giving 8-12-week trainings to large numbers of secondary school graduates to become HSAs and provide general health services at community level (Kok and Muula 2013) . In Mudzi, once a month, on a pre-announced date, all women with children under the age of five are supposed to gather under a big tree in which the HSA hangs a weighing scale (from which derives the local term for these sessions: sikeli) to monitor the children's growth. During these village sessions, the HSA additionally provides vaccinations to children and contraceptive injections to their mothers. He also provides general health advice, emphasizing among others the importance of going for ANC early in a pregnancy. It is during these sessions that women in Mudzi are told or reminded about the RBF4MNH cash and conditions.
The formal entry points of information about the RBF4MNH programme (ANC and HSA) exclusively reach pregnant women and those with children under 5 years of age. Other Mudzi women had however heard about this conditional cash transfer programme from women who received the money or from women who had someone close to them receive it. Others simply saw that one of their fellow village women suddenly had a substantial amount of money to spend, which had triggered questions and quick answers about the source of the money.
We did not find any woman, old or young, in Mudzi unaware of the cash reward for delivering at the hospital. Although by the end of January 2015 the word had not yet spread everywhere that the height of the cash transfer had per beginning of that month been increased from 3.600 to 5.600 MK, several women who had not themselves directly benefited from this increase did already know about it.
Discussion
What may explain the divergence?
The policy changes discussed in this article were introduced between 8 and 14 months before this study commenced. Both are concerned with the health of childbearing women and their infants. Pregnant women are informed about both policies during the ANC sessions at the nearest maternal health clinic that virtually all attend.
8 Despite these similarities, a clear divergence appeared when comparing the knowledge levels of the interventions even among women of childbearing age-the prime target group of interventions concerning EMTCT and MNH: few women had up-to-date knowledge about Option Bþ, while most were well informed about the RBF4MNH cash reward program. A seemingly obvious explanation for this divergence is the fact that information about Option B þ has only one entry point into the village community, while information about the other intervention has several: Option B þ is only communicated during ANC sessions at the clinic and thus in first instance only reaches pregnant women. Information about the RBF4MNH program is, besides being communicated about during the ANC sessions, also brought to pregnant women and mothers of young children by the HSA.
A first interesting question is why no effort is made by public health policy makers and implementers to spread information about Option Bþ. This comparative 'silence' may be intentional, as seems to be the case with other issues like the low infectiousness of HIV in general and when repressed by ARVs in particular. Possibly, it is feared that widespread knowledge may stimulate women to get pregnant in order to access ART or care even less about protection against infection. We must also note, however, that for Option Bþ to be effective, widespread awareness about it is not necessary. Its effectiveness hinges in first instance on women enrolling in ANC and getting tested for HIV, and, after counselled about it, being willing to take the prescribed medication. Maybe policy makers simply see no purpose in raising much awareness about Option Bþ.
Whatever the case, another interesting question remains: why information about Option B þ does not trickle through to the wider community. Women who receive information about it during the ANC session apparently do not talk about it when back in their village community. Meanwhile, the financial incentives program is discussed or at least mentioned by women amongst each other. What may explain this?
I suggest three reasons, related to differences in (1) perceived talk-worthiness, (2) motives for hiding or disclosure and (3) the visibility of the intervention, or in other words, the (im)possibility to hide. To start with the first: Women who knew about Option B þ (not the term, but its content) did not think it was a new or significantly altered policy. As far as they were concerned, prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV was already medicalized, and lifelong treatment was already considered standard protocol for people suffering from HIV. Possibly, clinicians offering HIV testing and counselling to these pregnant women mentioned but did not emphasize the lifelong-ness of the new treatment to temper initial apprehension. In contrast, the cash reward and penalty are considered outright novelties as prior to their introduction women could give birth where they desired without financial consequences. The RBF4MNH cash reward in particular is considered spectacular, which should not be surprising given the extremely poor setting of Mudzi. In fact, the sudden appearance of a large financial incentive for something that women already considered common practice, raised concerns about hidden motives behind this, and thus spurred talk too.
9 There is thus a distinction in the perceived talk-worthiness of the two policy changes, which may partly explain why two are talked about while the other is not. Another reason for this may be the stigma that continues to surround HIV infection. Even though ARVs are freely available to save the lives of those infected, suspicion of a positive status is feared to lead to 'social death' (see also Treves-Kagan et al. 2016) . One young Mudzi woman explained to us: 'If anyone would know that I am HIV positive, they will surely tell any man who considers proposing marriage to me and I will never hear from him again.' 10 Another
Mudzi woman, whose positive HIV status was disclosed to the community by her 'witness', 11 faced gossip by fellow villagers and was no longer loaned utensils. Another woman, known to be HIV infected, did not receive a much-needed subsidy coupon for fertilizer because fellow villagers had successfully argued to the distributor that "she will soon die anyway."
The women who benefit from Option B þ are those found to be HIVþ during ANC. It is very unlikely that these women would talk freely about their entry into the ART program, out of fear for such stigma. Similarly, it is unlikely that many other women who heard about the new treatment protocol during ANC will freely talk about this issue out of fear for being suspected to be HIV positive. 12 Moreover, it is quite possible for those who benefit from the new treatment policy to hide this fact. They must go to the clinic once a month to receive their medication, but nothing else reveals their enrolment in the treatment program. In fact, a great advantage of starting ART before becoming ill is that there is less to suggest a positive HIV status.
For women who benefit from the RBF4MNH cash reward, hiding is considerably more difficult. In a closely-knit, extremely poor community like Mudzi, possession of money is quickly noted. When, e.g. a village woman is washing clothes, others will immediately conclude that she apparently had money to buy soap, or had someone give her the soap-leading to questions and rumours about the source of the money or reason for the gift (Verheijen 2013) . Generally, money and gifts are assumed to come from men, specifically sexual partners. To 'neutralize' the bulk of cash that a woman brings home after a delivery at the clinic, hence to avert any suspicion that it may arouse, it is worthwhile to pro-actively spread the word and tell as many people as possible where the money came from and why exactly she received it. So, contrary to Option Bþ, it is not only difficult to hide involvement in the RBF4MNH cash reward program, but there is also a strong incentive to be open about it.
The gendered micropolitics of hiding and disclosing Interestingly, the suggested motives for both the structural silence on one policy change (Option Bþ) and prompt sharing of information on another (the RBF4MNH cash reward) result from and reflect the particular positionality of women within the research setting. As described, the studied community mainly exists of (fairly stable) clusters of kin-related women, with most men being either temporary or absent members. For the studied women, survival depends first and foremost on their social inclusion within these clusters and the village community at large, as these form their main source of support in times of need (see Verheijen 2011 Verheijen , 2013 . Association with HIV infection puts their inclusion at risk, and must therefore at all times be avoided (see also Bond 2006, Nombo and Niehof 2008) . As men are very differently positioned within these communities and the wider social environment, the dynamics that shape their survival strategies are likely to differ as well. Indeed, the few studies that have looked into Eastern and Southern African men's concerns about HIV and AIDS suggest that (risking) infection fits at least partly with a masculine ideal of sexual prowess (e.g. Kaler 2003; Siu et al. 2013) .
Another distinction between the cultural and socio-economic position of men versus that of women in this rural Malawian setting is that men's possession of money does not trigger questions, while women's possession of money does-as noted, often arousing suspicion of illicit sexual relationships. Hence, whereas this study found that women pro-actively informed their fellow villagers about the source of the cash reward that they received through the RBF4MNH project, the presumed motive behind this is unlikely to push men to behave similarly.
In sum, the suggested reasons for both keeping silent and for speaking up about certain topics are informed by and reflect markedly gendered sets of micropolitics. The flow (and stagnation) of information in this word-of-mouth communication is shaped by cultural and structural constraints and strategies that are not only specific to this specific setting, but within one and the same community affect men and women differently.
Conclusion
I started this article by pointing out the potential relevance of studying how new information spreads to understand its impact. Certainly, behaviour change does not only depend on information, as is painfully proven by the continued spread of HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa despite high levels of awareness and knowledge about ways to prevent infection. The reverse is true, however: new information cannot (directly) impact on behaviour if there is no awareness and knowledge about it. Understanding why certain information does not spread, e.g. by comparing it with information that does spread, can be helpful to increase the effectiveness of new behaviour change policies.
Notably, as mentioned, general behaviour change is not the aim of the so-called Option B þ health care policy. This may explain why policy makers and implementers seem to make little effort to raise awareness about this particular policy change. The number of information entry points does, however, not determine the pace and pattern of diffusion after entry. The case of Option B þ is interesting because information about it seemed not to spread at all through the studied community. A comparison with health policy information that did spread, led me to suggest three reasons for this: (1) perceived low talk-worthiness, (2) motives for hiding and (3) the possibility to hide.
The fact that certain information stagnates so consistently points to underlying causes that are both structural and collective in nature. In the case of awareness of the two policy changes compared here, I argue that the divergent spreading patterns can be explained by women's strategic responses to their cultural and socio-economic position within the research setting. The profoundly gendered nature of these micropolitics suggests that this article's analysis may well be generalizable to 'women's' responses to interventions related to HIV/ AIDS or involving cash transfers in comparable cultural and socioeconomic situations, but cannot account for those of men. What this underlines, is both the complexity and context-specificness of the logics underlying local responses to external development interventions, and, consequently, the need for holistic, case-specific attention to understand the (potential) impacts of new policies.
Notes
1. Initially an 'opt-in' approach was used, but few women voluntarily opted to be tested. In 2005, the Government of Malawi mandated a provider-initiated, 'opt-out' approach: pregnant women were routinely tested unless they explicitly refused. This significantly increased the number of women tested. In practice, many women feel they have no choice but to accept being tested in order to receive ANC (Angotti et al. 2011 ). 2. Newborns receive a daily dose of Nevirapine syrup until 6 weeks after birth. 3. Mchinji, Dedza, Ntcheu and Balaka. 4. Equivalent of 6.5 £ in January 2014. 5. Equivalent of 9.5 £ in January 2015. 6. Equivalent of 5 £ at the onset of this research. 7. In these 5 years, three women had intended to deliver in the hospital, but did not manage to reach there, giving birth on the roadside. Two other women had chosen to give birth at a traditional birth attendant's clinic, because they had detected symptoms of ailments that they felt could only be effectively dealt with by such a traditional birth attendant and not by staff at the biomedical clinic. Only one birth had actually taken place at home-which will be discussed further on. 8. Interestingly, the walls of the waiting rooms of this clinic are filled with posters, but none of these concerns Option B, the RBF4MNH program, or the chief's penalty against non-facility deliveries.
9. Indeed, the first Mudzi woman to give birth after the reward was introduced, decided to deliver at home out of fear for sinister practices such as blood or organ stealing at the clinic. The chief's fine for non-hospital deliveries then pushed the next Mudzi woman to deliver in the clinic despite her fears. She returned safely and with the promised money, after which the initial distrust disappeared and all women delivered at the clinic again. 10. See Verheijen (2013) about the vital importance of being (customarily) married in Mudzi to be a respected community member and so stand a chance of receiving community support in times of need. 11. To receive free-of-cost ARVs in Malawi, patients are required to bring with them a 'witness' (as Mudzi villagers call it) or 'buddy' (as health professionals call it). 12. Notably, whereas in Mudzi HIV and AIDS continue to be heavily stigmatized, maternal and newborn health are not.
Mudzi women who were explicit about not wanting to go for VTC, did attend ANC, even though they knew they would be tested for HIV there. Furthermore, Mudzi women felt no reluctance to (continue to) give birth at the clinic even though they assume that the recent push for this from government level is related to reducing mother-to-child HIV transmission rates. In this sense at least, it appears that integrating EMTCT in the general maternal health care has been an effective policy decision.
